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enforce a tax lien to federal courts, is apparently not as clear-cut as it
would appear on the surface, for Justice Hallows, in his dissent in
Monday, stated that he believed the O'Connor rule applies to state
courts as well as federal courts. Justice Hallows also found no implied
exclusion of a state court's jurisdiction, as the majority did, nor any
anomaly in according to the Wisconsin court the power to decide this
issue. He argued that the United States sought this result when it ap-
plied to the state court for enforcement of a lien against money in its
custoiy 61
Actually, the holding of the majority seems reasonable in light of
the federal statutes and the apparent anomaly of a state court over-
riding a federal officer's determination based on federal law. Should
Justice Hallows' view be adopted, additional problems would arise con-
cerning the extent of a state court's jurisdiction; for example: would
jurisdiction be limited to those cases in which the court held assets of
the taxpayer? In any event, it appears that it will take a federal statute
or at least a federal court decision stating expressly that a state court
has the power to determine the validity of a federal tax assessment on
its merits before Justice Hallows' view is followed in Wisconsin.
MARTIN J. KURzER
Diversity Jurisdiction: Erie Amenability of a Foreign Corpora-
tion to Federal Court Derivative Suit: In Lapides v. Doner' a mi-
nority stockholder of the DWG Cigar Corporation, incorporated in
Ohio, and three of the corporate directors brought a diversity derivative
suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michi-
gan against five directors and the corporation seeking a declaration that
resolutions adopted at a meeting of the board of directors were void.
The resolutions included the replacement of the plaintiffs with the
individual defendants on the board of directors and the executive
committee.
Since under Wojtczak v. American United Ins. Co.,2 the Michigan
courts would not assume jurisdiction over an action involving the
exercise of control or management of the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation, the case hinged on whether the Erie3 doctrine, as developed
by later cases4 required the district court to apply the Michigan rule.
Thus, the ultimate problem was whether the Michigan rule, as expressed
61 P. C. Monday Tea Co. v. Milwaukee County Expressway Comm'n., 29 Wis.2d
372, 383, 139 N.W.2d 26, 32 (1966).
1248 F.Supp. 883 (1965).2293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W. 364 (1940).
3 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Federal Courts in diversity
matters must apply the substantive law of the state wherein the cause of action
occurred, and federal procedural law.
4 Guaranty Trust Co., v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) ; Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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in Wojtczak, was a rule of substantive or procedural law. Neither party
disputed the proposition that the court must follow the rule in Wojtc-
-ak if a rule of substantive law was involved.
The decision by the Lapides court that the Wojtczak rule need not
be followed, ostensibly on the basis that it was a local rule of forum
non conveniens and thus subject to "procedural" classification under
Erie terminology, makes necessary a brief analysis of the much traveled
road of Erie.
The ultimate problem which Erie considered was the diversity issue
necessarily attendant upon a federal system of government: whether
federal or state law should be applied in diversity cases. In overruling
Swift v. Tyson,5 and destroying the concept of federal common law,
Erie set up an allegedly simple dichotomy of substance and procedure,
the inadequacy of which was recognized early. 6 The mechanical sub-
stantive-procedural test was supplemented in a subsequent decision,
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 7 which held that whenever the application
of a federal procedural rule would significantly affect the result of
litigation in a federal court, the rule is considered to be substantive and
state law applies. Although the Guaranty test limited the primary in-
ducement to forum shopping, its literal rule was neither practically nor
constitutionally feasible, since, in effect, the federal court in diversity
cases tended to become only "another court of the state."'8 Though
tempered somewhat by the "countervailing federal considerations" of
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Coop., Inc.,9 the Guaranty test continued
to set the pace. 10
In fact, the Court of Appeals in every circuit which has considered
the problem has applied state law in determining the amenability of a
foreign corporation to service of process by federal courts in diversity
cases." The leading case of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and Ware-
541 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).6 Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271, 301 (1939).
7326 U.S. 99 (1945).
8 Id. at 108.
9 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
10 Among the decisions upholding a literal interpretation of Guaranty Trust:
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), the Federal Court must follow state
law and policy in diversity jurisdiction; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535 (1949), reaffirming Angel; Arrowsmith v. United Press International,
320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), state law is controlling as to amenability to service
of process in a diversity case.11 Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948), Waltham
Precision Instr. Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (lst Cir. 1962) ;
Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1953); Stanga v.
McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959) ; New York Times Co.
v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961), Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v.
Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v.
William E. Hooper and Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952) ; National Gas
Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 959 (1960); Electrical Equipment Co. v. Daniel Hamm Drayage Co.,
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house Co.12 solidified this line. The Ragan court, in a diversity suit
beset by conflicting rules of service of process, held that the court
looked to local law to determine not only the primary elements of the
cause of action, but also the precise procedures by which the running
of a local statute of limitations against such an action could be inter-
rupted. Accordingly, it was held that the filing of the complaint in
federal court under Rule 3 was insufficient to "commence an action"
within the meaning of a state statute requiring service of the summons
to interrupt the running of the (substantive) statute of limitations.
The effect of the "not every vagrant effect" limitation of a recent
case, Hanna v. Plumer,3 is not certain; but the Lapides court evidently
presumed that Hanna overruled Ragan. Hanna held that Federal Rule
4(d) (1), rather than state law, governed service of process in a diver-
sity case, even though the effect of the holding was to give a different
result in federal court than in state court. However, Sylvester v. Mes-
sier,14 and Groninger v. Davison,5 concluded that Hanna did not over-
rule Ragan. Groninger, like Ragan, was a diversity suit for damages
suffered in an accident which occurred less than two years before
filing of the complaint but more than two years before the summons
was served. The Groninger court held that it was controlled by Ragan,
and that the suit was barred by Iowa's two-year statute of limitations.
In spite of Federal Rule 3, which provides that "a civil action is com-
menced by filing a complaint with the court," the Groninger decision
insisted that the action could not be commenced under the Iowa rule
by the filing of a complaint. Furthermore,
"While it is difficult to reconcile Hanna with Ragan, we never-
theless must conclude that the majority of the Supreme Court,
in supporting the opinion written by the Chief Justice, felt it was
not an overruling of Ragan. Until the Supreme Court itself
overrules its very positive statements in Ragan, the lower courts
must follow its holdings."' (Emphasis added.)
That Hanna may not stand for what the Lapides court thought it
did has ramifications in the Lapides opinion, since Hanna played a
significant role therein. The court bases its holding on three cases:
217 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1954); Ark-La Feed and Fertilizer Co. v. Marco Chem-
ical Co., 292 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co.,
179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949).
- 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
13380 U.S. 460 (1965).
14246 F.Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1964), AfF'd. 351 F2d 472 (1965).
1535 U.S.L. WE ic 2129 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1966).
16 This quote undoubtedly was made tongue in cheek, in order to prompt a Su-
preme Court pronouncement on the precise issue of whether Hanna overruled
Ragan. Express overruling of its own prior decisions has never been the pen-
chant of the Court. The Groninger statement that "Until The Supreme Court
itself overrules .. . the lower courts must follow" is not a proper application
of precedent; and would seem to be an attempt to bait the court into making
such an express pronouncement.
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Williams v. Green Bay and Western Railroad Co.,17 Koster v. Lumber-
mens Mutual Casualty Co., 8 and Hanna. The court first considers
Weiss v. Routh,19 which held that the Erie doctrine required application
of state law in refusing to assume jurisdiction over a case involving
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation and then attempts to dis-
tinguish the Lapides facts. The Weiss court based its holding on two
premises: (1) Unless it followed state law, it had no guidelines for the
exercise of discretion in deciding whether to accept or refuse jurisdic-
tion; and (2) The outcome of litigation should not be changed when
brought in a federal court rather than in a state court. The Lapides
court refuted the first theory by stating that both Williams and Koster
established guidelines, namely the forum non conveniens principles of
convenience, efficiency, and justice; and that both courts had indicated
that, if compelled to decide the question at issue here, they would hold
that federal courts are not obliged to follow a state rule declining
jurisdiction in cases involving the internal affairs of foreign corpora-
tions. The second theory is held to have been answered by Hanna, whose
scope is doubtful as previously considered.
It is submitted, however, that the real basis of the Lapides decision
is to be found in a line of cases, discussed in Hanna v. Plumer, based
on federal statutes, irrespective of the substantive or procedural ear-
marking called for by Erie. Significantly, this second line of cases was
dealt with in the original Erie opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis. Since
there are federal venue statutes dealing with this precise matter,20 the
more forceful argument can be made that federal law must apply irres-
pective of the Erie principle. In considering the applicability of these
statutes to Lapides, the fundamental scope of Erie must be examined.
The following is from Mr. Justice Brandeis' majority opinion: "Except
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the Law of the States.' '2 1 (Emphasis
added.)
Hence the paramount question: "Is the question of jurisdiction of
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation by a federal district court
in a diversity case decided by the Federal Constitution or by an Act of
Congress ?"
In characterizing the Wojtczak rule as a local rule of forum non
conveniens, a characterization which seems to have been amply sup-
ported,22 an affirmative answer must follow, for the federal laws of
27326 U.S. 549 (1946).
s 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
10 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945).
2028 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1958); 28 U.S.C. §1401 (1958).
21 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22 Williams v. Green Bay and Western Railroad Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946) ; Rogers
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 222
F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955).
[Vol. 50
RECENT DECISIONS
venue plainly include the general area of forum non conveniens. 28
U.S.C.§ 1404(a) provides:
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."
That section 1404(a) governs the general area of forum non con-
veniens is stated in strong language in several recent decisions of the
Court.23
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C.§ 1401, applicable to stock.holder's derivative
actions, provides that "any civil action by a stockholder on behalf of his
corporation may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the cor-
poration might have sued the same defendant." Since the DWG Cigar
Corporation could have sued the same defendants in Michigan because
of their residence there, it is clear that venue was properly in Michigan
under section 1401.
Thus we need only develop the syllogism envisioned in the Erie
opinion itself. Erie held that federal courts in diversity cases must apply
state law "except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress." Since questions of forum non conveniens are gov-
erned in the federal courts by an Act of Congress, sections 1404(a)
and 1401, the federal courts need not follow state rules of forum non
conveniens in diversity cases. Carried one step further, since the
Wojtczak rule is a state rule of forum non conveniens, it need not be
followed by the Lapides court in this diversity action.
With the previous discussion of Hanna v. Plumer in mind, it is
evident that the heart of Lapides is in the line of cases which resolve
conflicts of rule on the basis of an existing federal statue.2 4
2 3 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955) ; Willis v. Weil Pump Co., supra
note 22; Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946). Regarding
policy developments in the field of internal affairs of a foreign corporation,
RESTATEMENT (Second), CoNFLIcr OF LAWS §117e, comment d at 69 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1957) states:
"Internal affairs of foreign corporation. At one time, it was customary for
the courts to evince strong reluctance to interfere with the 'internal affairs' of
a corporation that had been incorporated in another state. On this basis, stock-
holders' suits against foreign corporations were frequently dismissed in situh-
tions where the alleged wrong affected plaintiff solely in his capacity as a
member of the corporation. This doctrine enjoys less force at the present
time. The fact that the suit involves the internal affairs of a foreign corpora-
tion is held by the courts today to be but one of the factors to be considered
in determining whether the forum selected is an appropriate one for the suit.
This factor, moreover, will rarely be of crucial significance unless the nature of
the relief demanded would require the court to exercise detailed and continued
supervision over the corporation's affairs."
24 Hanna itself was based on the federal statute line. In Hanna, the Supreme
Court for the first time was faced with a direct conflict between state law and
the federal rules. In vigorously upholding the federal rules, the court very
carefully made this distinction between the two lines of cases previously con-
sidered, before basing its decision on the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §2072
(1958). The Hanna decision was directly opposed to the conclusion which
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It would seem that Lapides and Hanna are indicative of the trend
toward a continuing re-evaluation of Erie, with special emphasis upon
its limitations. But the nature of diversity jurisdiction in a federal
system of government is such that no definitive resolution is possible.
The prognosis would indicate that the Supreme Court will soon be faced
with a conflict between a federal statute and a state rule when the state
rule reflects policy considerations which, under Erie, would lie within
the realm of state legislative authority.
JAMEs DuFFY
Orenstein foresaw, as noted in Erie Potpourri, 38 CONN. B.J. 69 (1964). Oren-
stein proposed that federal rules be abolished in diversity cases!
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